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The Limits of Limits on Divorce
Robert M. Gordon
[L]egal control of marriage has no call to deal with hypothetical
fungible legal spouses seen in the flattering mirror of the ought-to-be.
Its business is with people as they are. Its first premise should be that
the weak, the overbearing, the nasty, the selfish-those who have
failed of decent effort to make a marriage go-are least likely
prospects to rear well because of mere compulsion to stay in
unsatisfactory marriage.
-Karl N. Llewellyn'
On July 15, 1997, Louisiana became the first state to roll back its no-fault
divorce law.2 Although a Louisiana couple can still enter a .contract
marriage" terminable after a six-month separation, a couple may also choose
to establish a "covenant marriage" that can be dissolved only by a two-year
separation or proof of fault.' For all the media attention it has garnered, this
new law is significantly less restrictive than its sponsors and no-fault's critics
had hoped. They have pressed for laws that would eliminate the option of
divorce without fault, require the consent of both parties to divorce, or extend
the waiting period for divorce without consent to as long as seven years.'
Advocates of change argue that divorce has hurt children and that
restrictive laws can help them.5 If this claim is right, then there are powerful
arguments from many perspectives for rewriting the divorce laws. Protecting
I. K.N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law ofDiiorre (pi 2). 33 CoLt M L Ri-\ 249. 284 (1933)
2. See Covenant Marriage Act. 1997 La. Acts 1380 (codified at LA REV STAT A%.%. § 9"224 to 309
(West 1997)); see also Jon Jeter "Covenant Marraages "" ie the Kiti righith. WAS PosT, Aug. 15. 1997.
at Al.
3. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:307.
4. See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
5. See Jeter, supra note 2 (describing concern for children as the *'real catalys'" behind recent
legislative efforts).
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children is a widely shared American value.6 The law governing family
dissolution already reflects a "children first" approach. 7 The best-known
academic approach to family law also holds that "the law should make the
child's needs paramount." s More broadly, liberal political theory embraces
limitations on adult autonomy to protect children from palpable harms.9
Helping children thus provides a widely accepted rationale for restricting
divorce.
The child-oriented critics of no-fault divorce press two attacks on the
current regime. Most argue that no-fault divorce has increased the divorce rate,
that divorce hurts children, and hence that no-fault laws hurt children. 0
Others claim that no-fault laws hurt children by leaving divorced mothers,
usually the custodial parents, with inadequate financial resources." From
either perspective, divorce law raises a simple question: "Are we willing to put
the well-being of children first ... ?,,1
These criticisms of no-fault divorce rest on a distinct vision of human
nature and legal power. It is an optimistic vision, influenced by economic
analysis, in which people respond rationally, predictably, and morally to
changes in legal regimes. Many authors have questioned such assumptions, and
one sensibility within modern political thought provides a particularly vivid
contrast. Judith Shklar, Isaiah Berlin, and Michael Oakeshott ground their
liberal commitments to freedom in skepticism about legal power. They suggest
that because of social diversity, many legal reforms will produce losses that
optimists overlook. They recognize that cultural norms and economic realities
may influence people far more than law. And they argue that intractable vices
often mock, and sometimes pervert, legal efforts to shape conduct. This
"skeptical liberal" sensibility commends to law a modest mission-not so
much stopping destructive conduct as minimizing its effects.
Taking up the invitation of a skeptical liberalism to view family life with
sensitivity to its intricacy and law with skepticism about its power, this Note
6. See Robert Pear, Greasy Kid Stuff, Washington Kidnaps Dick and Jane, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1997,
§ 4 (Week in Review), at I (discussing the political potency of appeals to child welfare).
7. See Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REv.
1, 5 (1987) (noting wide agreement on the principle "that disputed custody decisions ought to be settled
exclusively or nearly exclusively according to what is in the child's best interest").
8. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL
ALTERNATIVE 7 (1996).
9. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REV.
687, 731-33.
10. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L.
REv. 9,29-37 (1990); Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REv.
79, 101-02, 113-15; Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization.
Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 88-90 (198 1); William A.
Galston, Divorce American Style, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1996, at 12, 14-18.
I. See, e.g., ALLEN M. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 79-88 (1992);
LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 378 (1985); Gary S. Becker, Finding Fault with No-
Fault Divorce, BUs. WK., Dec. 7, 1992, at 22.
12. Galston, supra note 10, at 26.
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argues that highly restrictive divorce laws would have little effect on divorce
rates, but would impose large costs on children. Contrary to the overbroad
claims by some of no-fault's critics, recent research shows that while some
children suffer serious harm from divorce, other children benefit from divorce,
and many others suffer mostly from harms connected with divorce but distinct
from it. If restrictive legislation stops helpful divorces or exacerbates
independent harms to children, then it will have costs that the narrow focus on
divorce obscures.
These findings suggest that in order to help children, law must be a precise
instrument as well as a powerful one. New evidence suggests that law is
neither: Compared to cultural and economic influences, the law has a small
influence on rates of marital breakdown. This finding is a puzzle for those who
insist that people rationally respond to legal incentives. Clinical observation
attests to the intuition supplied by skeptical liberalism: Many people who are
divorcing are conflicted, confused, short-sighted, or self-involved in ways that
resist legal improvement. As a result, proposals to condition divorce on fault
or mutual consent would likely encourage destructive conduct that hurts
children more and leaves their parents less financially secure than current law.
Legal changes more symbolic and less restrictive than those favored by many
of no-fault's critics might still discourage harmful divorces and, more
important, would not inflict new pain on children."
Part I of this Note summarizes the argument that no-fault divorce hurts
children. Part II elaborates the assumptions of this argument and offers the
alternative of a skeptical liberalism. Part III shows how the facts about divorce,
children, and the law confirm a skeptical liberal's intuitions that sharply
restricting divorce will not help children. Part IV suggests small reforms that
would not hurt children, and might help them. "
13. Some critics of the current regime are acutely au are that tough lay., can backlire See,. e i;.
Galston, supra note 10, at 26 (*At some point, highly demanding laws become less cffcctic than those
that are less restrictive."). Much of this Note argues simply that the point of dminishing returns from
restriction arrives much sooner than critics believe.
14. Because its focus is the relationship between child welfare and las governing marital disolution.
this Note has two important limitations. It discusses laws regulating post-divorce finance% only to the extent
that these laws alter the operation of grounds for divorce and their effect on children. see nfru notes 161.
181. not as variables independently affecting children. Similarly. the effects. of disorce on adult vell-being
are analyzed only to the extent they touch children. The Note does not discuss claims that adult% as vell
as children gravely suffer from current law or have a fundamental "'nght to d:orce " In focusing on
children, the Note defends no-fault divorce at what even some of its supporter, concede is its .,cakcst
point. See, e.g., Margaret Talbot, Love. American Style. NEw REPLttLIC. Apr 14, 1997. at 30. 32
(describing the anti-divorce movement as "incontrovertibly correct" about the "dire consequences" of
divorce for children). It is possible, however, that consideration of divorce law in wider perspeetive would
yield additional arguments for (or against) strict regulation.
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I. THE CHILD-CENTERED CASE AGAINST NO-FAULT DIVORCE
Critics of no-fault divorce attack legal reforms of the last three decades.' 5
Until the late 1960s, virtually every state formally permitted divorce only if
one spouse proved that the other was insane or had committed statutory
fault.' 6 Spouses who agreed to divorce could in practice collude to "prove"
fault, although this often required perjury.' 7 In 1966, New York liberalized
its very strict law to permit divorce based on consent after a two-year
separation or on fault grounds other than adultery. 8 In 1969, California
became the first state to eliminate all fault grounds and permit divorce based
on "irreconcilable differences."' 9 California's law actually meant that either
spouse could get a divorce simply by filing for one, even if the other spouse
resisted.20 By 1985, every state allowed couples to divorce without proving
fault,2' and today only four states require mutual consent for such a no-fault
divorce.22 A system that required fault in theory and consent in practice has
become one that almost always sanctions unilateral no-fault divorce.
According to critics, this shift to no-fault divorce has hurt children by
increasing divorce rates and by leaving custodial parents with fewer resources.
Sharply curtailing or eliminating no-fault divorce would, on the critics'
account, significantly reduce these harms.
A. Increased Divorce
Critics assert that when parents break up, children suffer. Some authors
15. See, e.g., Galston, supra note 10, at 13.
16. See IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW 165-66 (2d ed. 1991). Fault grounds typically
included some or all of the following: cruelty, desertion, adultery, neglect, and drunkenness. See Lawrence
M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, Who Sues for Divorce? From Fault Through Fiction to Freedom, 5
J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 66 (1976). A few states had quietly adopted provisions allowing divorce without fault
prior to 1967. See HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN TIlE
UNITED STATES 81 (1988).
17. See MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 251-52 (1972); Lawrence
M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OR. L. REV. 649, 661-62
(1984).
18. See JACOB, supra note 16, at 40-41.
19. See Family Law Act, ch. 8, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3324.
20. See J. HERBIE DIFoNzo, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE 168 (1997). This has been the reality under
no-fault laws elsewhere as well. See id. at 172.
21. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 189 (1989). Many slates
preserve fault grounds alongside no-fault grounds. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-40 (1997); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 452.320 (1997). Because the no-fault grounds establish the easiest and least costly means to
divorce, spouses usually use the fault grounds only to achieve their financial goals, not to obtain divorces
that otherwise could not occur. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 187. For a discussion of the role of
fault-based financial distributions as a deterrent to marriage-destroying conduct or divorce, see infra notes
161, 181.
22. See Ira Mark ElIman & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional Abuse as a Tort?, 55 MD. L.
REV. 1268, 1277 n.24 (1996) (listing Mississippi, New York, Ohio, and Tennessee as the exceptions).
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suggest that divorce always or almost always harms children,23 often relying
on the much acclaimed, pessimistic work of Judith Wallerstein.24 Others
recognize that divorces that end marriages "involving physical abuse or
extreme emotional cruelty" can benefit children, 5 but treat such divorces as
a small minority26 or an afterthought. '  On critics' accounts, divorce
generally scars children for life. 8
The next step in this critique asserts that no-fault divorce has increased
divorce rates. Demographic data appear to connect the rise in divorce rates
with the shift to no-fault divorce. Lynn Wardle argues that "it is apparent that
the significant rise in the divorce rate in the United States did not begin until
the no-fault divorce movement was well-underway."2 9 William Galston cites
the most recent state-by-state analysis of divorce rates, which found that the
average rate of divorce after the enactment of no-fault legislation was about
twenty percent higher than before."
Explaining these societal trends at the individual level, critics argue that
the no-fault regime has encouraged divorce by reducing its costs."3 The
expense of divorce is nowv lower, 32 delays are shorter," and legal barriers
are few. 34 As a result of these reduced costs, critics say that individuals are
both more likely to engage in marriage-destroying conduct"5 and, at a given
23. See, e.g., Younger, supra note 10. at 90; Dora Sybella Vivaz. Note. Balancing Cildren's Rights
into the Divorce Decision. 13 VT. L. REV. 531. 579 (1989).
24. Wallerstein has tracked children of 50 divorced parents for more than two decades See JLIDmI
S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE. SECOND CHANCES: MEN. WOMEN AND CIIILDRE.N A DECADE
AFrER DIVORCE (1989); JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERUN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAK. P HOW
CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980): Barbara Vobcdja. Cildrern ofDivorce Heal Slots.
Stud, Finds, WASH. POST. June 3. 1997. at El (discussing \Valleiitein s recent followa,-up report) She has
found that "'almost half of the children [in her study] entered adulthood as worred. underachiesing. self-
deprecating, and sometimes angry young men and women." WAIIERSTEIN & BLAKLStL- supra. at 299
For examples of critics who have relied on her work, see Allen M. Parkman. Reform of the Dirorre
Provisions of the Marriage Contract, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 91. 104 n.59 (1995); and Viva., supra note 23.
at 531 n.2.
25. Galston, supra note 10, at 15.
26. See, e.g., Talbot, supra note 14. at 33 (discussing critics" often repeated assenrton that 15% of
divorces involve high levels of conflict).
27. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 10. at 32-33 (devoting less than a paragraph to the issue)
28. See. e.g., Galston, supra note 10, at 15 (stating that divorce negatisely impacts "school
performance, high-school completion, college attendance and graduation. labor-force attachment and wtork
patterns, depression and other psychological illnesses. crime. suicide. out-of-wedlock biths. and the
propensity to become divorced"): see also Scott. supra note 10. at 29-31 (listing ills assmiated with
divorce).
29. Wardle, supra note 10, at 118.
30. See Galston, supra note 10, at 17 (citing Paul A. Nakonezny et al.. Die Effect of No-Fault Divote
Law on the Divorce Rate Across tire 50 States and Its Relation to Income. E__ducaton, and Religiosirv. 57
J. MARRIAGE & FAMo. 477, 485 (1995)).
31. See Theodore F. Haas. The Rationalhtv and Enforceabilitv of Contractual Restrt ons on Ditorre.
66 N.C. L. REV. 879, 889 (1988); Scott. supra note 10. at 21. Scott. supra note 9. at 727. Wardle. supra
note 10, at 124; Galston. supra note 10, at 17-18.
32. See CONSTANCE AHRONS. THE GOOD DIVORCE 40 (1994).
33. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTrERN LAw 76 (1987)
34. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
35. See. e.g., Haas. supra note 31. at 889: Scott. supra note 10. at 50-54
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level of marital decay, more likely to opt for divorce.36 Thus critics assert that
no-fault divorce fosters divorce, which hurts children.37
B. Greater Financial Burdens
The second argument against no-fault divorce focuses on finances. Women
retain physical custody of children following ninety percent of divorces,38 and
generally suffer a large drop in their standard of living after divorce.39 This
decline hurts children directly, by reducing the resources available to them,
a0
and indirectly, by straining mothers psychologically.4
Many authors have blamed these results in part on no-fault divorce. At the
level of societal trends, critics cite both longitudinal42 and cross-sectional43
studies showing that women fare worse under no-fault divorce. At the level of
individual behavior, the argument against no-fault assumes that mothers resist
divorce while fathers seek it.' This ostensibly occurs because women "lose
value" on the marriage market over time.45 The fault regime gave women
opposed to divorce a valuable bargaining chip: their consent. By threatening
to contest a divorce, a wife could force her husband to confront the prospect
36. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 10, at 48-50; Galston, supra note 10, at 19. To be sure, the Coase
Theorem predicts that if transaction costs are low, a husband and wife will decide to divorce when shared
costs from marriage outweigh shared benefits, regardless of the legal regime. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW 407 (1995); H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage and Divorce: Infornational Constraints and
Private Contracting, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437, 438 (1986). However, because spouses are not able to
exchange all of their gains from marriage, such as gains from the presence of children, a unilateral divorce
regime may allow some divorces that a fault or consent regime would prevent. See Martin Zelder,
Inefficient Dissolutions as a Consequence of Public Goods: The Case of No-Fault Divorce, 22 J. LEGAL
STUD. 503, 505-06 (1993).
37. Some critics also assert that no-fault laws have encouraged divorce by destigmatizing it. See
Galston, supra note 10, at 18. This argument, stressing law's effect on culture rather than on cost-benefit
calculation, is not inconsistent with the perspective that this Note develops. But it does not justify the
highly restrictive measures proposed by critics. Law may be able to affect culture without sharply restricting
conduct. Moreover, even if sharp restrictions were necessary to motivate cultural change, they might not
be justified if their costs-especially their costs for children-were too great. See infra Part IV.
38. See Scott, supra note 10, at 33.
39. Recent studies of both old and new data have shown that women on average suffer about a 30%
decline in their standard of living following divorce, largely because they must still care for children. See
Saul Hoffman & Greg Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences of Divorce?, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 64 I,
641 (1988); Richard R. Peterson, A Re-Evaluation of the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 61 AM. Soc.
REv. 528, 534 (1996).
40. See Paul R. Amato, Children's Adjustment to Divorce: Theories, Hypotheses, and Empirical
Support, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 23, 32-33 (1993).
41. See Judith Desimone-Luis et al., Children of Separation and Divorce: Factors Ilfluencing
Adjustment, 3 J. DIVORCE 37, 37 (1979).
42. See WEITZMAN, supra note 11, at 167-68 (describing California time-series data).
43. See Galston, supra note 10, at 18 (citing Peters, supra note 36, at 449 tbl.6 (comparing settlements
for women in states with various divorce restrictions in the late 1970s)).
44. See Ann Laquer Estin, Economics and the Problem of Divorce, 2 U. CHI. L. SCHI. ROUNDTABLE
517, 541-42 (1995); Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM
AT THE CROSSROADS 130, 135 & 255 n.17 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
45. See Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce and Quasi Rents; or "I Gave Him the Best Years of My
Life," 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 278-87 (1987).
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of a costly, embarrassing, and uncertain proceeding, and extract a decent
financial settlement as the price of an easy, collusive divorce. 6 Without at
least a de facto consent requirement, critics argue, children will suffer
economically from divorce.
C. Proposals for Change
To protect children from psychological and emotional harms, child-
centered critics all aim to eliminate fast, unilateral, no-fault divorce. For
families with children, the most radical measures would eliminate unilateral
no-fault divorce entirely47 or permit it only after prolonged waiting periods
of four or more years. " Other proposals would permit unilateral no-fault
divorce, but only after a waiting period of two years. 9 Under all these
proposals, mandatory waiting periods would be waived or dramatically
shortened when one spouse is guilty of statutory fault," and sometimes also
on the basis of consent." In contrast to the "'covenant marriage" legislation
enacted in Louisiana, the proposals offered by child-centered critics are
generally mandatory.5 2 Given the child-oriented perspective, this makes sense:
If divorce hurts all or almost all children, then the task of a child-protecting
law is to make divorce more difficult in all families with children, not only
those that want a tougher law.
5 3
46. See Parkman, supra note 24, at 94.
47. See. e.g., S. 1409, 43d Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Anz. 1997); H.R. 1066. 1997 Sess (N C ). H R. 2624.
1997 Sess. (Va.); A. 2547, 207th Leg.. Ist Sess. (N.J. 1996): HR. 4432. 88th Leg.. 1995 Sess. (Mich.)
48. See, e.g., H.R. 472, 64th Sess. (Vt. 1997); Becker. supra note I I (proposing to allow unilateral
divorce only if spouses cannot agree after "'several years"): Maggie Gallagher. Why Make Divorce Easy7 .
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 1996, at A19 (proposing a five-to-seen year waiting period); Galston. upra note
10, at 22 (proposing a five-year waiting period).
49. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 10. at 90-91. Such a proposal became law in Louisiana See LA REV
STAT. ANN. § 9:307 (West 1997).
50. See, e.g., N.C. H.R. 1066: Mich. H.R. 4432; Gallagher. supra note 48. Galston. supra note 10. at
22. But see Scott, supra note 10, at 92 (arguing against a fault-based bypass of the saitmg period)
51. See, e.g., Ariz. S. 1409; Gallagher. supra note 48. Galston. supra note 10. at 22
52. The sponsor of the Louisiana legislation initially hoped to require "covenant marrage." accepting
a choice regime only as a necessary compromise. See James Gill. Covenant Marriage: 1ill It Mork 7.
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 20, 1997. at B7; cf Younger. supra note 10. at 90-91 (proposing a
mandatory regime); Galston, supra note 10, at 22 (satne).
53. Choice might by itself help children in two ways. First. parents whose children have the most to
gain and least to lose from restrictions on divorce might be most likely to choose the cosenant option But
there is no evidence that people at the threshold of marriage hase this level of foresight See Lynn A. Baker
& Robert E. Emery, When Even' Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Etpectations of Divorce
at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & Huht. BEtAv. 439. 443 (1993) (stating a survey result show ing that
"the median response of marriage license applicants was 0% when assessing the likelihood that they
personally would divorce"). Common sense suggests that those least likely to divorce may select the mist
restrictive regime, so that a tough law will tend to govem those it is least likely to affect A choice regime
could also help children if the act of choosing strict terms by itself reduced the likelihood that parent.
would divorce. But on this plausible account, the content of the high-commitment option is less important
than its presence. Even if that option were little more restnctice than current law. the benefits of choice
could be achieved without the costs of a restrictive regime.
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II. Two VISIONS OF LIFE AND LAW
The child-centered case against no-fault divorce, like the view it opposes,
rests on a distinctive vision of human nature and legal authority. Carl
Schneider has forcefully argued that no-fault divorce presumes that unregulated
individuals will do what is best for their families,54 and thus reflects a
"'complacently positive attitude toward human nature [and] social order.' 55
This part argues that the real optimists are the critics of no-fault divorce who
believe that law can help children by reducing divorce. After identifying these
critics' assumptions, this part develops the darker sensibility of a skeptical
liberalism.
A. The Optimism of No-Fault Criticism
The argument that tougher divorce laws can help children by stopping
divorce reflects considerable optimism about both the accuracy of legislative
classification and the extent of human rationality. The criticisms of no-fault
divorce rest on a series of generalizations about human experience: Children
suffer from divorce; people will divorce less when the costs of divorce are
greater; marriage-destroying conduct can be identified and labeled "fault."
Such generalizations mirror the scientific aspiration of economic analysis, its
effort to construct an elegant theory based on a few axioms. 56 These
generalizations justify sweeping policy prescriptions.
The critics' confidence in their own powers of generalization is matched
by their optimism about both human rationality and the appeal of family life.
Like economic analysts of law, critics of no-fault divorce identify two ways
that people are rational: They have stable ends,57 and they identify and pursue
the least costly means to those ends.58 Critics posit that people who choose
to divorce when faced with a short waiting period will try to make their
marriages work when faced with a longer one. For this to happen, these
individuals must be able to learn about and understand different legal regimes,
and must consistently view the longer wait in the stricter regime as a cost.
54. See Carl E. Schneider, Marriage, Morals. and the Law: No-Fault Divorce and Moral Discourse,
1994 UTAH L. REV. 503, 561-62.
55. Id. at 558 (quoting DENNIS H. WRONG, THE PROBLEM Or ORDER: WHAT UNITES AND DIVIDES
SOCIETY at ix (1994)). Elsewhere, Schneider has argued that modem family law and no-fault divorce law
reflect doubts about law's enforcement power and fears about human frailty. See Carl E. Schneider, Moral
Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1837-38 (1985). This
Note echoes these arguments.
56. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 17 (4th ed. 1992) ("[Aibstmction is of
the essence of scientific inquiry, and economics aspires to be scientific.").
57. Cf. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY at ix-x (rev. ed. 1991) (noting the importance
of stable preferences in economic analysis): JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN
RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 65-66 (1979) (same).
58. See Scott, supra note 10, at 32; Galston, supra note 10, at 19; cf. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE
LOST LAWYER 227 (1993) (describing the efficiency assumption): POSNER, supra note 56, at 12-16 (same).
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Moreover, in order for the incremental increase in cost to change behavior, a
substantial desire to preserve the marriage must weigh against the wish to
separate. People who have utterly given up on their marriages will not
reconcile if divorce becomes slightly more difficult. The critics' reform
proposals can succeed only if people are both generally committed to their
families and rational.
These reflections suggest why no-fault's critics believe that divorce law
can play a powerful role in helping children. If the legislator can identify
social problems and their causes in individual conduct, and if people will
change their conduct in response to changes in its perceived costs, then laws
altering the costs of different behaviors can predictably improve outcomes. One
result of proper incentives may be some harshness toward those not improved,
but that is a price the critics are willing to impose.5
B. The Alternative of a Skeptical Liberalism
A trio of authors offers a counterpoint to this vision. Despite their
differences, Isaiah Berlin, Michael Oakeshott, and Judith Shklar had much in
common. They were essayists, not systematizers. They argued that theory often
teaches less than history, especially this century's history. Each was at once
a liberal committed to individual autonomy, and a conservative doubtful about
the state's power to shape conduct sensibly.' These "skeptical liberals
' ' 6
grounded apprehension about law's power in part in observation of three social
facts that no-fault's critics occlude: irreducible social complexity, societal
trends that often dwarf law's power, and irrational passions not responsive to
legal incentives.
59. See Wardle, supra note 10, at 120-21 (arguing for greater focus on "mantal stability" and less on
"divorce facilitation"). Writing in 1860. Horace GrceleN argued for harsh di'.orce la',s bs analogy "It Is
very hard,' said a culprit to the judge wvho sentenced him. 'that I should be so seserel, punished for merely
stealing a horse.' 'Man.' replied the judge. *you ar not so punished for merely stealing a horse, but that
horses may not be stolen."' NELSON MANFRED BLAKE. Tit- ROAD TO RELO- A HiSTOR'N or. DIVORCE I%
THE UNITED STATES 92 (1962) (quoting the New )brk Tribune of Apr 7. 18601
60. Each author defends liberty and questions tutelary legislation ',,,ith equal ferocit, See ISAIAH
BERLIN, Two Concepts of Libert'. in FOUR ESSAYS ON Liti-RT-) 118. 122-31. 171-72 I 69j (famously
defining and defending "negative liberty" as freedom from coercion). MICIIAEL OAKLSiioTr. On Beitn.g
Conservative, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAls 407. 427 (ret ed 1991) t"ITlhe office
of government is not to impose beliefs and acti, ities upon us subjects, not to tutor or to educate them. not
to make them better .... ): Judith N. Shklar The Liberalism of Fear. in LIBERALISM AND ""ti MORAL
LIFE 21,33 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed.. 1989) (rejecting "educatine gos emmeni that ains at crealing specific
kinds of character and enforces its own beliefs")
61. Commentators have emphasized the combination of skepticism and liberalist in all three authors"
thought. See CLAUDE J. GALIPEAU. ISAIAH BERLIN'S LIBERAtuS' 55 (1994). Se)la Benhabib. Judith
Shklar's Dystopic Liberalism, in LIBERALISM WITIIOIrT ILIt SiONS EsSA) S ON LIoER.M. TIIEORN AND TIlE
POLITICAL VISION OF JUDITH N. SHKLAR 55. 57 (Bernard Yack ed. 1996) [hereinalter LIIIERALISMt
WITHOUT ILLUSIONS]; Jeremy Rayner, The Legend of Oakeshott's Consersatins Sceprtual Philosophl und
Conservative Politics, 18 CANADIAN J. POL. S'. 313. 337-38 (1985) Of course, grouping three brilliant
and idiosyncratic thinkers together under one programmatic banner does violence to their s, ork. but it also
helps illuminate some of their ideas and a great deal about contemporar) regulation of the famil,
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Attacking abstraction, these authors first stress the irreducible complexity
of modem life and the inevitable tradeoffs that generalized policies entail.
"[D]iversities and occasions of conflict," not "order and coherence,"
"distinguish our current manner of living."62 This does not make social
science impossible, but it does require that the social scientist respect diversity,
rather than distance herself from it. "[G]enerality is apt to be uninstructive.
Insight lies in the dense and the particular."63 The complexity in our social
life reproduces itself in the moral realm, where the moralist must recognize the
possibility that loss is inevitable: "[If] the ends of men are many, and not all
of them are in principle compatible with each other, then the possibility of
conflict-and of tragedy-can never wholly be eliminated from human
life. .. ."6 The policymaker alert to this moral and social complexity
recognizes losses that the critic of no-fault can ignore: "[T]here is no such
thing as an unqualified improvement. ' 65 Instead, "any study of society shows
that every solution creates a new situation which breeds its own new needs and
problems. 66
Extending their argument about complexity, these authors stress the
irreducible role of nonlegal systems in shaping behavior and the concomitant
limits on the power of laws to improve conduct.67 While the critics emphasize
the influence of law on conduct, these authors stress the nonlegal forces that
limit law's power: "[C]hoices are limited by the circumstances of men and
their environment. '68 Legislating therefore requires a "developed historical
and sociological sense [to] show[] what can and cannot be achieved given a
particular social condition, or the material conditions, of a nation. '69 Laws
that are very effective in one time or place may be impotent in another, and
what plainly "cannot be achieved" is the transformation of the norms and
practices of a people by the law.70 "[C]ulture sets boundaries which
governments overstep at their peril."
71
62. OAKESHOTr, supra note 60, at 425-26.
63. John Dunn, Hope Over Fear: Judith Shklar as Political Educator, in LIBERALISM WITHOUT
ILLUSIONS, supra note 61, at 45,47; see also JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 228 (1984) (eschewing
high theory and commending "a more concrete way of thinking about politics, one closer to men and
events").
64. BERLIN, supra note 60, at 169.
65. OAKESHOTT, supra note 60, at 411.
66. ISAIAH BERLIN, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY 1, 14 (1992).
67. This position parallels Robert Ellickson's critique of "legal centralism," the view that "governments
are the chief sources of rules and enforcement efforts." ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 138
(1991).
68. Isaiah Berlin, Reply to Robert Kocis, 31 POL. STUD. 388, 391 (1983).
69. GALIPEAU, supra note 61, at 123; cf. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR
INCLUSION 13 (1991) (describing the struggle between formally equal institutions and illiberal popular
dispositions).
70. OAKESHOTT, supra note 60, at 430 (stating that the govemment that "'commands for truth' is
incapable of doing so (because some of its subjects will believe its 'truth' to be error)").
71. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, MONTESQUIEU 105 (1987) (describing Montesquicu's view); cf. ELLICKSON,
supra note 67, at 281-82 (noting a "wide variety of reasons [that] legal interventions can flop").
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Along with particular cultural constellations, irrational elements of human
nature are on this view daunting obstacles to law's incentivizing aspirations.
The skeptical liberal sensibility depends less on a "model of rational egoism,"
of the sort on which no-fault's critics rely, than on "theories of violent and
mindless passions and the extraordinary unlikelihood of self-control."7 These
authors find in people not stable ends, but a welter of conflicting desires; not
calculation sensitive to shifts in costs, but delusions that defeat incentives; not
a constant commitment to goods like the family, but an equally constant
inclination toward vice. Shklar's "liberalism of fear" reflects her "deep
skepticism about our capacities for public and private rationality" and her
awareness of "the everyday vices and prejudices that defeat our attempts to
rationalize our social lives. 73 Berlin describes humanity as a "crooked
timber," quoting Kant: "Out of timber so crooked as that from which man is
made nothing entirely straight can be built."74 Impulsive and irrational
individuals cannot make the calculations or apply the self-control needed to
respond to adjustments in legal regimes. The limitations of reason are also
limitations on law.7 5
In a chilling exposition of this argument, Shklar suggests that state efforts
to improve moral character through coercion will sometimes not only fail, but
also perversely increase suffering and undermine virtue. Rulers inflict great
pain in the name of noble goals.7 6 Those ruled respond to that pain with an
irrational backlash, "an uncontrollable 'physiological reaction' that paralyzes
judgment and makes room for all of the basest and most irrational human
passions. 77 The effort to cure moral weakness with the rod thus may produce
only the inferior character of the slave whose "every impulse is hemmed in by
fear, cruelty, and a massive dishonesty. ,71
Because legal efforts to improve conduct often fail or backfire, these
authors finally question what no-fault's critics affirm, that the law should in
many circumstances sacrifice compassion in a particular case to secure better
72. Stephen Holmes, Ordinary Passtons in Descartes and Rac tne. t LIBERALSM WMIOm T ILLLsiom.
supra note 61, at 95, 95.
73. Bernard Yack, Liberalism Mahout Illusions: An lantrhtcton to Judith Shkhir's Politcal Thought.
in LIBERALISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS, supra note 61. at I. 2
74. BERLIN, supra note 66. at xi (internal quotation marks omitted) George Kennan echoes Bcdn's
assessment in a reflection on politics, calling "man" a "cracked '.esscl'" ,hosc -contradictions destroy
the unity and integrity of his undertakings, confuse his efforts, place limits on his possibilities for
achievement, and often cause one part of his personality to be the enemy of another" GEORGE F KENNAN.
AROUND THE CRAGGED HILL: A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL PILOSOPIY 27 (1993)
75. See KENNAN, supra note 74. at 54-55 ("The people ,ho want goemment's head to be in the
clouds should remember that its feet are mired, understandably but inesitably, in the clay.")
76. See SHKLAR, supra note 63. at 27. 35-37 (describing .anous crielties of missionaries and
philanthropists).
77. Yack. supra note 73. at 3 (quoting SHtKLAR. supra note 71. at 84-85)
78. SHKLAR, supra note 63, at 236: see also id. at 242 ("[Fear] is the underlying psychological and
moral medium that makes vice all but unavoidable.")
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conduct in the future.79 The faith in law as incentive is largely fantasy:
Society is frequently too complex, the law's role in social life too limited, and
the individual too impetuous for legal incentives to encourage moral conduct
reliably. Rather than seeking to improve individuals, law must often focus on
the narrower project of "damage control," or not doing more harm. 80 There
is work enough for law in cleaning up the diverse messes that people
invariably make.
This "skeptical liberalism" is best understood as a sensibility or a set of
intuitions, not a theory of justice or social organization. This sensibility may
prove more revealing in some domains of law than others. Some areas of
society may manifest with particular intensity the conditions that motivate
caution against paternalistic legislation: an especially tangled web of factors
contributing to social goods and problems, particularly sharp limitations on
law's power, and passions that run unusually high. Although constructing a
general theory for identifying the presence of these conditions is beyond the
scope of this Note, the next part argues that the aspect of family life relating
to divorce is one sphere in which the concerns expressed by Shklar, Oakeshott,
and Berlin prove quite relevant.
III. A CASE AGAINST RESTRICTIVE DIVORCE LAWS
Empirical research and historical experience confirm the three cautions of
skeptical liberalism. The complex relationship between divorce and child
welfare recalls the warning against confident generalizations that obscure tough
tradeoffs. For children of parents who break up, divorce is not the only or
often the dominant source of harm, and laws that make divorce more difficult
will not serve children if they increase the harms from sources other than
divorce. A law that helps children must be a scalpel, not a bludgeon. Yet, the
history of divorce regulation confirms the second caution of skeptical
liberalism, that social norms and economic realities may sharply limit law's
power. Demographic data suggest that legal change has never had more than
a small effect on rates of divorce, and that long-term social trends are the chief
predictors of family breakdown patterns. Clinical studies of the divorce process
help explain why law is not an effective instrument for stopping divorce: As
the third dimension of the skeptical liberal paradigm suggests, individuals often
79. See BERLIN, supra note 60, at 171 n.1 (agreeing that the state should not .'torment the living,
under the pretence of promoting the happiness of them who are not born' (quoting Jeremy Bentham)).
Compare Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law,
97 HARV. L. REv. 625, 633, 674 (1984) (discussing the tension between deterrence and compassion, and
arguing that conventional analysis, which ignores law's coercive function, produces "an unduly placid and
benign picture of law"), with SHKLAR, supra note 63, at 244 ("No liberal ever forgets that governments are
coercive.").
80. Shklar, supra note 60, at 27; see also Stanley Hoffmann, Judith SlIklar as a Political Thinker, in
LIBERALISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS, supra note 61, at 82, 89 (discussing the injunction to "do no harm").
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lack the calculating self-control to respond rationally to legal incentives. Rather
than improving most couples' conduct, restrictive divorce laws inspire perverse
and cruel behavior in some families, and exacerbate the pain of divorce in
many others. In seeking to force people not to harm their children, restrictive
divorce laws cause those children new harms.
A. Against Abstraction: Children and Divorce
Without more, the claim that "divorce hurts children" is both too strong
and too simplistic. Studies do suggest that divorce harms many children, but
not as many or as much as the critics claim. Wallerstein's often-quoted results
overrepresent parents with unusually serious problems."' A large but less-
cited literature has compared the outcomes within less biased samples of
children from divorced and intact families. Two comprehensive analyses of this
literature by Paul Amato and Bruce Keith found that divorce did have a
negative impact on children across a wide range of factors.82 Yet Amato and
Keith also found that more sophisticated studies showed smaller effects,"' that
effects had diminished since the 1950s and 1960s,' and that the net effect of
divorce on children was "weak."8 5 That weakness has two dimensions: the
average size of the effect on children is small, 6 and the number of children
seriously affected is limited.87 Many researchers agree that "it is wrong to
conclude that divorce places children at great risk for experiencing
psychological disorder.""8
The limited effects of divorce have two implications for legal reform,
suggesting the merits of a cautious approach. First, law's power to improve life
81. See WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 24. at 328 (descnbing ho%% a majont) of the study's
subjects had significant emotional problems): Andre%% J Cherhn, It's Not a Sentence to Life at Emnotional
Hard Labor, BALTIMORE SUN. July 9. 1997, at 13A (critciing attempts to generalize about all children
from Wallerstein's work).
82. See Paul R. Amato & Bruce Keith. Parental Divorce and Adtdr lWI-Beani; A Mera.Anal ius. 53
J. MARRIAGE & FAMi. 43. 54 (1991) (hereinafter Amato & Keith. Adult Well-Being,'. Paul R Amato &
Bruce Keith, Parental Divorce and the Well-Being of Children -A Alera-Analist. 110 PsYC'HOL B1t. L. 26.
30 (1991) [hereinafter Amato & Keith. Well-Being of Chtldren).
83. See Amato & Keith, Velil-Being of Chldren. supra note 82. at 36
84. See id. at 34.
85. Amato & Keith, Adult Well-Being. 3upra note 82. at 55. Amato & Keith. Well.Brim q Childrrn.
supra note 82, at 30.
86. See Amato & Keith. iell-Beitng of Children. supra note 82. at 30
87. See FRANK F. FLRSTENBERG. JR. & ANDRE%% J CIILR I%. Di% tIDo F wII.S NVtt,." Hu1.'1 %S TO
CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART 69 (1991). A typical recent study found that di orce %as &associated % ith
a 39% increase in the risk of psychopathology among young adults, but also thai 89% of children ot
divorce did not suffer clinically significant psychological problems See P Lindsza Cha.c-LUndjilc ct al,
The Long-Tern Effects of Parental Divorce on the Mental Health of Young Adults A Detelopniental
Perspective, 66 CHILD DEV. 1614, 1628-29 (1995) The author, concluded that 'in the %a~t majority of
cases, there is substantial recovery following divorce.' Id at 1629
88. ROBERT E. EMERY. RENEGOTIATING FAMILY R _ATIo",SItIPs DVOR(-i:. CIIILD CL sroDN. AND
MEDIATION 204 (1994): see also Cherln, supra note 81 ("We shouldn't scare dt',orccd pirents suth the
false information that their children are doomed to face a dtfficult life "'
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is limited. Because the negative impact of divorce itself is modest, the positive
impact of reducing divorce rates, even if law could do it, would be modest as
well. Second, when improvements are possible, they have costs. If the decline
in the harms of divorce over time results even in part from legal changes that
made divorce less difficult for parents, then laws restricting divorce will hurt
children of parents who divorce in spite of the law.
As the last point suggests, a law seeking to help children cannot focus
exclusively on stopping divorce. Factors associated with divorce but distinct
from it cause many of the difficulties that children of divorce experience."
Numerous studies have shown, for example, that many years before divorce,
children of parents who eventually divorce have more psychological and
behavioral problems than children of parents who remain together.90 Most
scholars agree that predivorce differences account for much, though not all, of
the differences between children of divorced and intact families. 9' Divorce
obviously cannot be the cause of these predivorce problems.
The law here faces the tradeoffs that Berlin and Oakeshott anticipate and
that the critics' focus on divorce occludes. Legal change that seeks to reduce
the divorce rate may increase the incidence of other factors harming children.
Some things that hurt children of divorce, such as the apparently high
incidence of severe psychological difficulties among divorcing parents, 92 are
largely unresponsive to legal change.93 Other factors that harm children, such
as the custodial parent's post-divorce psychological adjustment, 94 may be
affected by the law, but not in the way critics hope: If divorce becomes more
difficult to obtain, then parents may have more emotional trouble, not less. A
law restricting divorce thus will not reduce some harms to children of divorce
and may intensify others.
A restrictive law may adversely affect the most important predictor of
child welfare in divorcing families: parental conflict. 95 Fighting between
89. See Lawrence A. Kurdek, Issues in Proposing a General Model of the Effects of Divorce on
Children, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 39, 40-41 (1995) ("My own prediction ... is that the identification of
changes in resources and stressors associated with divorce-related life transitions that directly or indirectly
affect children's well-being will enable us to abandon our long-standing obsession with family structure.").
90. See, e.g., Nazli Baydar, Effects of Parental Separation and Reentry into Union on the Emotional
Well-Being of Children, 50 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 967, 976 (1988); Jeanne H. Block et al., The Personality
of Children Prior to Divorce: A Prospective Study, 57 CHILD DEV. 827, 832 (1986); Andrew J. Chcrlin
et al., Longitudinal Studies of Effects of Divorce on Children in Great Britain and the United States, 252
SCIENCE 1386, 1388 (1991).
91. See, e.g., Paul R. Amato & Alan Booth, A Prospective Study of Divorce and Parent-Child
Relationships, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 356, 363 (1996).
92. See Benjamin B. Lahey et al., Conduct Disorder: Parsing the Confounded Relation to Parental
Divorce and Antisocial Personality, 97 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 334, 336 (1988).
93. Psychosis, for example, is largely genetic. See Kenneth S. Kendler & Scott R. Diehl,
Schizophrenia: Genetics, in I COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 942, 942 (Harold I. Kaplan &
Benjamin J. Sadock eds., 6th ed. 1995).
94. See Amato, supra note 40, at 28.
95. See id. at 30-31.
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parents hurts children in myriad ways. 96 Parental conflict usually diminishes
after divorce, 97 and "[t]he eventual escape from conflict may be one of the
most positive outcomes of divorce for children." 9' Divorce actually improves
the well-being of children who "live in a household filled with continual
conflict between angry, embittered spouses."" That characterization includes
the cases of sustained physical and emotional abuse on which the critics of no-
fault divorce focus, but it is also broader, including conflict well short of
abuse.' 0° Although researchers do not know precisely how many divorces put
an end to marriages involving sustained high conflict,' those who venture
guesses suggest it is a significant number, approximately thirty percent.0 2 In
addition, it appears that very intense conflict usually immediately precedes
divorce even in marriages that were fairly quiet until the very end.' 3 If legal
change were to stop divorce only by preserving marriages with high levels of
old or new conflict, children would not benefit.
This complex reality undercuts optimism about law's power to improve
society. Other things being equal, reducing divorce would be good for children,
though not as good as critics claim. But reducing divorce is less good for
children if so doing piles new burdens on custodial parents in families that do
divorce. And it is no good at all if the reduction in divorce is achieved only
by preserving high-conflict marriages. Other things are not always equal, and
they matter a great deal.
96. See Robert E. Emery, Interparental Conflict and the Children of Diucord and Dii one. 92
PSYCHOL. BULL. 310, 319-24 (1982).
97. See FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN. supra note 87, at 26 ("By the end of the second )car follosing
separation, in all but a small minority of cases the disputes are limited to occasional flare-up "'
98. E. Mavis Hetherington, Divorce: A Child's Perspective. 34 AI. PSYCIIOLOGisT 851. 855 t1979)
99. FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 87. at 71-72. see also Paul R Amato & Alan Booth. rhe
Consequences of Parental Divorce and Marital Unhapnness for Ahdt Well.Being. 69 SO" lzokwu 895,
895 (1991); Hetherington, supra note 98. at 855: James L Peterson & Ntcholas Zill. Marital Disruption.
Parent-Child Relationships. and Behavior Proble,,s ai Children. 48 J MARRIAGt: & FA., 295. 298-303
(1986); Michael Rutter, Parent-Child Separation: Psschological Effects an the Children. 12 J CHItD
PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY & APPLIED DISCIPLINES 233. 255 (1971)
100. In one well-known study, the authors defined as "high conflict" any mamage in% hich the parent-.
characterized themselves as "not too happy." Peterson & Zil, supra note 99. at 297 Another study showed
that adults who perceived their parents' marriages stmply as "not too happy" siere much less likely to have
happy marriages than adults whose parents had divorced. Alan Booth & John N Edsiards . Transmiassion
of Marital Quality over the Generations: The Effect of Parental Divorce and Unhappiness. J DI',ORCsE.
Spring 1990, at 41, 50, 55.
101. Telephone Interview with Robert E. Emery. Professorof Psychology. Uniierit of Virginia (Aug
22, 1997).
102. See CARLA B. GARRITY & MITCIIELL A. BARIS. CAL GIT 1% TIlL NIIDDLI PROTf(CT%G Til.
CHILDREN OF HIGH-CONFLICT DIVORCE 43-44 (1994)
103. See FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 87. at 21. Law. rence A Kurdek & Albert E Siesky.
Jr., An Interview Study of Parents' Perceptions of Their Children's Reactions and Adjustments to Donre.
3 J. DIVORCE 5, 7 (1979). wallerstetn reports that dunng the "'acute" phase of dlorce just prior to one
parent's exit from the home, "well over half of the children in our study %iitnc-sed physical violence
between their parents. Before this time, 75 percent of the children had neier seen physical %iolcnce at
home." WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 24. at 8
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B. The Law in Society: Regulation and Divorce Rates
The sociological sensibility of skeptical liberalism recognizes that in some
spheres of life, social and cultural influences may sharply limit the power of
law. Until recently, "overwhelming evidence" appeared to demonstrate the
sharp limits on law's power over marital breakdown, showing that legal
changes in America and abroad had had "little or no effect on divorce
rates."' 4 America's divorce rate climbed almost constantly between 1865
and 1980,1'5 growing even in many periods when the law did not
change.t06 Studies from abroad show that where strict divorce laws have
clashed with changing morals, the morals have won in a rout.'.7 Historians
identify varied nonlegal forces that have driven increases in the divorce rate
regardless of legal climate. These include economic factors, particularly
women's emerging social equality and increased employment; demographic
factors, such as longer lifespans; and ideological factors, like the ascendancy
of aspirations for romantic love.'0 8 Simply reciting these nonlegal factors
underscores the historically circumscribed effects of regulation on divorce.
Critics now claim that new evidence refutes the suggestion that legal
changes have had little impact on divorce rates. These claims are not decisive.
Wardle points to the sharp rise in the divorce rate between 1968 and 1975.1 9
For purposes of considering the effect of legal changes, however, those years
actually consist of two periods: 1968 to 1969 and 1970 to 1975. The rise in the
divorce rate was striking throughout: about 0.3 divorces per 1000 population,
or 6% to 12%, per year."0 In the first two-year period and the two years
immediately prior to it, however, very little legal change occurred: Only four
states-New York, North Carolina, Kansas, and Delaware-altered their
laws,"' and between 1968 and 1970 the increases in the divorce rates in
those states account for at most 14% of the increase in the divorce rate
104. Thomas B. Marvell, Divorce Rates and the Fault Requirement, 23 L. & Soc'Y REV. 543, 547
(1989); see also RHEINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 406 ("Experienced observers have long known ... that a
strict statute law of divorce is not an effective means to prevent or even to reduce the incidence of marriage
breakdown.").
105. See ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 22 fig.l-6 (rev. ed. 1992).
106. See BLAKE, supra note 59, at 226.
107. See JOHN EEKELAAR, REGULATING DIVORCE 22 (1991) (describing Spain's restrictive divorce
laws and high separation rate); RHEINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 262 (same for Italy); Anthony Faiola, Chile
Debates Dropping Divorce Ban That Foes Say Takes High Social Toll, WASH. POST., Aug. 5, 1997, at A 12
(same for Chile).
108. See, e.g., RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUrTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY
582-634 (1988).
109. See Wardle, supra note 10, at 118; see also supra text accompanying note 29.
110. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE 1976, at 2-6 (1977) [hereinafter MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 1976]; U.S. BUREAU Or TIlE CENSUS,
VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 1971, at 2-6 (1972) [hcreinafter
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 1971].
I 11. See Nakonezny et al., supra note 30, at 480 tbl. I.
[Vol. 107: 14351450
1998] Limits on Divorce 1451
nationally. 112  The floodgates of legal reform broke only in 1970. t"'
Changes in legal restrictions cannot be the cause of a trend in divorce rates
that antedates virtually all legal change.
On close examination, the new study on which Galston relies also suggests
that nonlegal trends were the chief cause of the recent spike in divorce rates.
The study overstates any effect of laws by using a biased measure of the
divorce rate after legal change." 4 But even if the study did show that a
significant increase in the divorce rate followed passage of no-fault laws, it
fails to disaggregate the effects of legal change and the effects of the year in
which legal change occurred. If, as this Note suggests, divorce rates rapidly
increased between 1968 and 1975 chiefly as a result of nonlegal factors, then
states changing their laws in that period would see greater increases than states
acting before or after: The years, not the laws, would matter most.
The new study supports this hypothesis. Among the five states that passed
reforms before 1968 or the twelve states that passed them after 1975, the
average increases in the divorce rate following the legal enactments were 0.3
and 0.2 per 1000, respectively." 5 These rates of change are not significantly
higher than the average national rates of increase over these years." 6 Among
states passing reforms in the critical middle period (1968 to 1975), the average
increase was 1.1 per 1000, much higher than in states changing their laws
before or after those years."' Thus, rates of change ostensibly attributable
112. This figure was calculated using the data in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 1971. supra note I I0. at
2-6. The 14% number overstates any actual increase in divorce in the two states, because before 196S New
York residents frequently traveled to other states to get divorced. See BLAKE. .iupra note 59. at 171
(estimating that 35% of divorces granted to New York residents in 1950 were in courts of other states)
New Yorkers who would have divorced elsewhere prior to the legal change and then disorced in New York
are counted in the 14% figure.
113. See JACOB, supra note 16. at 59, 80 (describing how other states quickl) followed Caliotamla'
example).
114. The study's measure of the divorce rate after legal change is the aserage rate for the three )ears
immediately following the law's passage. See Nakonezny et al.. supra note 30. at 479 During the
immediate aftermath of legal change making divorce easier, divorces quickly occur that sould hase
eventually occurred anyway. See BECKER, supra note 57. at 333-34 The magnitude of the effect reported
in the study is therefore exaggerated.
115. This figure was calculated from Nakonezny et al.. supra note 30. at 480 Ibl I
116. For example, between 1961 and 1967. when most of the earl) states changed their law,, the
national divorce rate crept upward by about 0.06 per 1000 per year See US Bt. RI-At O- Tiff- C.%st s.
VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 1966. at 2-6 ( 1967). MARRIAG %%D
DIVORCE 1971, supra note 110, at 2-6. Although this number seems much loser than the 0 3 figure in the
Nakonezny et al. study, when properly understood it is not Because that study measure, an ascrage for
three years before and three years after a law's passage. it %%il associate with the lass an inrease in the
divorce rate greater than the average annual increase in any period when the disorce rae is rising At a
time like the early 1960s, when the national rate was rising fairly steadily, a measurement o national
changes using Nakonezny et al.'s method would produce an increase four times the annual change That
is, the mean for the three years prior to the year selected would be the figure for the ,econd year prior, and
the mean for the three years after the year selected would be the figure for the second year after, and there
would be four years in between. Four times the average annual change between 1960 and 1967 is
0.24-roughly the average that Nakonezny et al found.
117. This figure was calculated from Nakonezny et al.. supra note 30. at 480 ibl I by aseraging
Nakonezny et al.'s figures for the 33 states enacting laws between 1968 and 1975
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to laws are closely linked to years. Like the national data, the state-by-state
study thus suggests that national trends cresting around 1968, not legal changes
(which were not then national), were the key cause of the sharp upturn in the
divorce rate." 8
Although the reasons that law is not effective at stopping marital
breakdown are complex, one of them is the widely shared commitment to
liberty that Berlin, Shklar, and Oakeshott articulate with particular
eloquence." 9 Some people unable to end their marriages in law have always
ended them in fact by separating. 120 Usually the law has permitted
formalization of separations, though sometimes it does not.'2' Never in
modern America, however, has the state sought to force unhappy spouses to
live together.2 2 Such an effort would invade privacy in a way unthinkable
to a society that respects even a modicum of individual liberty. Precisely
because critics of current law respect personal freedom and would not force
unhappy couples to remain physically united, 2 1 their proposed reforms
would in practice simply drive some couples to delay divorce and others to
separate without divorcing. The evidence suggests that both results occur with
some frequency: Legal changes have historically produced temporary shifts in
118. This hypothesis is also supported by evidence showing that the four states that did not join the
national move toward unilateral no-fault divorce did not depress their divorce rates relative to the national
average. The following table compares divorce rates in 1967, before any of these four states or virtually
any others had changed their laws, and in 1983, at least five years after all four states had changed their
laws and after nearly all other states had also changed theirs.
STATE DIVORCE RATE AS A PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL AVERAGE
1967 1983
Mississippi 108% 106%
New York 15% 73%
Ohio 108% 102%
Tennessee 123% 129%
These figures were calculated from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, VITAL STATISTICS OF TIlE UNITED
STATES: MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 1984, at 2-6 (1985); and MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 1971, supra note I10,
at 2-6.
The current divorce rates in all four states are close to the averages for the regions in which those
states are located as identified by the U.S. Census Bureau. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OFTHE UNITED STATES-1996, at 107 tbl.153 (1996) (showing that in 1994 the New York rate
was 3% higher, the Ohio rate 12% higher, the Tennessee rate 8% higher, and the Mississippi rate 7% lower
than regional averages).
119. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
120. See GLENDON, supra note 21, at 148.
121. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW 353-56 (3d ed. 1995).
122. In Puritan Massachusetts, courts did order couples to live together. See PHILLIPS, supra note 108,
at 284-85. For a moderately sympathetic account of the "writ for restoration of conjugal rights," see Carol
Weisbrod, The Way We Live Now: A Discussion of Contracts and Domestic Arrangenents. 1994 UTAH L.
REV. 777, 812-13.
123. None of the major legislative or academic proposals to tighten divorce law, see supra notes 47-53
and accompanying text, would grant such authority to the state.
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divorce rates that dissipate over time,"4 and separation rates predictably rise
when divorce laws tighten. 2 5 The law's limited power over divorce reflects
the limited scope of the law in a free society.
C. The Recalcitrance of Vice: Law and Individual Conduct
The psychology of divorce also limits law's power. If ever there is a time
when people are likely to look far more like the crooked timber and cracked
vessels of the skeptical liberals than the decent maximizers of the reformers,
the period of marital breakdown is that time. As the skeptical liberal might
anticipate, divorcing individuals are often "too tormented, distracted, and
bewildered to focus steadily on the difference between a cost and a
benefit."'' 26 They are therefore unable to respond to legal changes in the
calculating way that reformers require. Three forms of human limitation mock
law's efforts to save marriages in order to help children: lack of attention to
the consequences of actions, nonconscious motivational processes, and
imperfect reasoning.
The first limit on responsiveness to legal change is the common failure to
focus either on the law or on the consequences of personal conduct. It is not
at all clear that most people know much about divorce law.'27 Everyday life
has countless stresses, and even if people would be wise to learn the broad
outlines of the legal regime, they may be unable or unwilling to gather the
energy to do so. Persons too distracted to learn the law cannot alter their
conduct on its account.
More critically, even when people do know about divorce law, that
knowledge will not affect conduct not seen as likely to precipitate marital
breakdown. 2 1 Marrying couples typically believe they will never
124. See BECKER, supra note 57. at 333-34.
125. See PHILLIPS, supra note 108. at 604-05 & fig. 14-3 (sho'ing that the rate of separation, in
France decreased precipitously when divorce was legalized in 1884). RuEISr EI%. supra note 17. at 453
(showing that states with stricter divorce laws had higher separation rates during the l6Ws) In the 1950-,.
when the divorce rate nationally was low and New York had one of the stictest [a%%% in the United States.
informal abandonment was a major problem in New York City. See BLAKL supru note 59. at 202.
RHEINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 271. Today in Chile. where divorce is illegal. "'it is esttnmated that nearly half
of all married adults have separated unofficially.-" Fatola. supra note 107 These data suggest that sorte
hard-to-identify fraction of any shift in divorce rates during periods of legal change merely reflects the
conversion of separations under strict law into divorces under liberal law. or '[ce scr,,i
126. Holmes, supra note 72. at 96.
127. See Baker & Emery, supra note 53. at 441 (rponing that mamage license applicants Nurseycd
had a knowledge of divorce laws "only slightly better than chance*). cf. ELLiCKSO\. isipra note 67. at 144-
45 (reviewing studies and stating that "ordinary people know little of the pnsare substanti'.e Ia
applicable to decisions in everyday life"): Carol Weisbrod. On Mhe Etprrs3itre Futirons of Fwnt s Law.
22 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 991, 1000 (1989) (noting a *'general feeling . that people do not knos, much
about the law or legal system").
128. Cf Elster. supra note 7, at 34 (It is far from clear that married people make a rational
assessment of the probability of divorce and adjust their behas tor accordingly -j
The Yale Law Journal
divorce.129 When their marriages do break down, the cause is often an
aggregation of small decisions, many made without any thought that they
might eventuate in divorce.130 Many spouses see or claim to see only
retrospectively how their relationships broke down.13' Even then, some still
report that they are "[n]ot sure what happened."' 32 It is easy to understand
why: Human cognitive capacity is limited, and more immediate concerns than
the risk of a divorce often monopolize people's thinking. 33 Thus, either
because they do not learn the law or do not see that their actions may have
legal consequences, many people will continue to undermine their marriages
without any thought about such consequences.
In a second pattern of conduct that resists legal modification and evokes
Berlin's favorite quotation, 134 the end of marriage may be a series of
"crooked transactions."'135  Unlike the critics' imagined spouses whose
preferences concerning marriage have some constancy and clarity, the typical
individuals on this account are driven to destroy their marriages by
"nonconscious motivational mechanisms that shape [their] desires 'behind
[their] backs. ' , 136 Thus, in about eighty percent of divorces, one spouse
decides to end the relationship before the other wants it to end, 37 yet even
the initiating spouse often does not immediately articulate the desire for a
divorce. He or she "wants out of the relationship but denies that wanting and
cannot or will not declare the true intention."'138 Lacking a "deliberate
intent ... to harm the marital relationship,"' 139 but seeking to resolve a
129. See Baker & Emery, supra note 53, at 443.
130. See Regina L. Donovan & Barry L. Jackson, Deciding To Divorce: A Process Guided by Social
Exchange, Attachment and Cognitive Dissonance Theories, J. DIVORCE, Fall 1990, at 23, 30-31 (noting that
a decision to divorce is often "the end result of a series of smaller decisions made by an individual ... in
the absence of the person's feeling like he/she has made any definite decision"); Joseph Federico, The
Marital Termination Period of the Divorce Adjustment Process, 3 J. DIVORCE 93, 94 (1979) (describing
central moments in the divorce process as ones of which "the person may be unaware").
131. Cf. Joseph Hopper, The Rhetoric of Motives in Divorce, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FANt. 801, 804 (1993)
(finding "little correspondence" between predivorce experiences and post-divorce descriptions of motives).
132. Gay C. Kitson & Marvin B. Sussman, Marital Complaints, Demographic Characteristics, and
Symptoms of Mental Distress in Divorce, 46 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 87, 93 (1982).
133. See Donovan & Jackson, supra note 130, at 31 (discussing how the limits of cognitive capacity
make the use of optimizing strategies difficult during the divorce process); see also IRVING L. JANIS &
LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT
22-27 (1977) (reaching the same conclusion for decisionmaking generally).
134. See supra text accompanying note 74.
135. Federico, supra note 130, at 98. The discussion that follows chiefly relies on the accounts in id.
and JOSEPH GUTrMANN, DIVORCE IN PSYCHOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVE: THEORY AND RESEARCH 59-61 (1993).
Other authors have offered similar descriptions of the divorce process. See, e.g.. FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN,
supra note 87, at 22; WILLIAM J. GOODE, AFTER DIVORCE 135-36 (1956); DIANE VAUGHAN, UNCOUPLING:
TURNING POINTS IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 91-100 (1986).
136. JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY 20
(1989).
137. See FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 87, at 21-22.
138. Federico, supra note 130, at 98; see also GUTrMANN, supra note 135, at 59 (stating that one
party may "want to dissolve the relationship yet stay in it").
139. Federico, supra note 130, at 99.
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muddle of mixed feelings, 4 " the spouse then "implement[s] what (s)he is
likely to recognize, in retrospect, as strategies for terminating the marital
relationship."'' Not intending to deceive, spouses nonetheless say one thing
and do another: "There is a driven quality to their behavior. They may
apologize, ask for forgiveness, beg for understanding or patience, be analytic
or rational to the end, but the basic point is that the acting-out continues and
may escalate."'42 Those "impelled" in this way ruin their marriages through
actions such as "[t]riggering controversies or fights," stopping only when
divorce is certain.'43  Because the veneer of "analytic or rational"
consideration does not control the underlying impulsion to divorce, legal
manipulation of costs whose comprehension requires calculation, such as the
financial repercussions or likelihood of divorce, is not likely to affect the basic
pattern of conduct. Increases in costs cannot change conduct that is not
governed by calculation of costs at all.
In a final pattern of conduct that resists legal restriction, the attempt at
deliberation is thwarted less by unconscious motivations than by imperfect
reasoning processes. A familiar form of cognitive bias is the tendency to
engage in "wishful thinking," focusing on gains and ignoring losses.'4 When
marriages begin, people are typically optimistic, and they do not learn the law
of divorce or alter their conduct in response to it.' s5 As marriages end,
fixation on gains from divorce may be so powerful, and consideration of costs
so limited, that measures incrementally increasing losses have little effect.
Some psychologists have theorized that people considering divorce weigh three
things: the benefits of marriage, the potential benefits of divorce, and the
potential costs of divorce.'46 Importantly, research much more strongly
confirms the importance of the first two factors than that of the third.
Perceived barriers to divorce apparently play little role in divorce
decisionmaking' 47 Because the calculation of barriers is not an important
140. See GLr'ITMANN, supra note 135, at 59 (describing the role of cognitie dissonance in divorce
decisionmaking). Contemporary psychology emphasizes that the dnve to resol.e cogniui.e dissonance may
alter pre-decisional as well as post-decisional processes. See JANIS & MANN. supra note 133. at 83-85,
141. Federico, supra note 130, at 130 (emphasis added), see also VAUGIIAN. supra note 135. at 114
(noting that the initiator's goal often is "'to tiy, but to fail").
142. Federico, supra note 130, at 104.
143. GIYITANN, supra note 135. at 60; see also Federico. supra note 130. at 100-03 (diwcuIng
'provocation" and "'sabotage" strategies for terminating mamages)
144. See JANIS & MANN, supra note 133. at 91-92. 107-09
145. See Baker & Emery. supra note 53. at 448.
146. This is called "'social exchange theory." See Sian L. Albrecht & Phillip R Kunz. The Decision
To Divorce: A Social Exchange Perspective. 3 J. DIVORCE 319. 320-22 (1980). George L inger. A Social
Psychological Perspective on Marital Dissolution. in DIVORCE AND SEPARATION. CON"EXT. CAL SES AD
CONSEQUENCES 37, 37-48 (George Levinger & Oliver C. Moles eds.. 1979)
147. See Robert G. Green & Michael J. Sporakowskt. The Dynamics of Divorce Marital Qualit.
Alternative Attractions, and External Pressures, J. DIVORCE. Winter 1983. at 77, 77 (finding that barriers
had a significantly smaller effect on the divorce decision than attractions to mamage or disorce). Gay C
Kitson et al., Withdrawing Divorce Pettoions: A Predictive Test of the Exchange Model of Diorce, J
DIVORCE, Fall 1983, at 51, 61 (finding that the five strongest influences on the decision to withdraw a
divorce petition were attractions to mamage or to alternatives. not barriers to divorce)
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part of the decision to divorce, laws incrementally increasing barriers to
divorce are not likely to affect decisionmaking. The failure of rationality, the'
willful blindness to costs, is too profound.
Taken together, these findings support the skeptical liberal intuition that
legal restrictions on divorce will stop little marital breakdown because people
are too cognitively limited, too impassioned, or too deluded to respond
rationally to legal change. By the time couples soberly contemplate the
possibility of divorce and the implications of law, their marriages are likely to
be at a very late stage of breakdown.'48 At that point, relationships are often
very hostile.1 49 Extending a high-conflict marriage will not help children, yet
the reconciliation and reduction in conflict that would help them are
improbable once conflict has escalated. 150 At the point late in the divorce
process when people are most likely to acknowledge and reason about the law,
the question is less whether law can stop separation than whether it will
intensify the destruction caused by the separation process.
D. The Perverse Effects of Divorce Restrictions on Children
It is when the law's power to improve conduct is at a low ebb that the
skeptical liberal charge to "do no harm" makes most sense. Even when law
cannot improve morals, it can still inflict harm and arouse vice. As their
marriages collapse, people are not likely to respond to law. But because
divorce requires legal formalization, individuals who have decided to end their
marriages have no choice but to adjust their conduct to the legal regime. In the
marital "endgame," when law most matters, the incentives created by tough
divorce laws are unfortunately perverse. These laws encourage further
Some have argued that the recent reduction in legal barriers explains these findings, see Albrecht &
Kunz, supra note 146, at 328, but two sets of data provide some evidence that the tendency to ignore such
barriers is simply a fact of divorce decisionmaking. First, even before the shift to no-fault, the great
majority of spouses did not identify the law as a significant factor in their decisions to divorce. See
GRAHAM B. SPANIER & LINDA THOMPSON, PARTING: THE AFrERMATH OF SEPARATION AND DIVORCE 97
(1984) (finding, in a state with a fault-based law, "no evidence that individuals are inclined to avoid or
postpone divorce or to attempt reconciliation as a result of the current adversary statute"). Second, in the
one study that compared the perceptions of benefits and barriers to divorce in couples where one spouse
sought the divorce and the other resisted it, the "leaver" and "left" perceived different gains from marriage
and divorce, but identical barriers to divorce. See Leora E. Black et al., An Exploratory Analysis of the
Construct of Leavers Versus Left as It Relates to Levinger s Social Exchange Theory of Attractions,
Barriers, and Alternative Attractions, J. DIVORCE, Spring 1991, at 127, 136.
148. See GOODE, supra note 135, at 138 (showing that a majority of couples went from "serious
consideration to final decision" on divorce in less than four months); cf. Bernard L. Bloom et al., Marital
Separation: A Community Survey, I J. DIVORCE 7, 15-16 (1977) (reporting a survey result indicating that
87% of separations end with divorce).
149. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
150. Judith Wallerstein makes a similar point in an interview, noting that long waiting periods "never"
produce reconciliation in broken-down marriages. Katha Pollitt, Can This Marriage Be Saved?, NATION,
Feb. 17, 1997, at 9, 9.
[Vol. 107: 143S1456
Limits on Divorce
destructive conflict, and this conflict in turn increases children's suffering from
divorce.
At first blush, a waiting period may seem likely to do little damage
because a person resolved to divorce can begin a separation and then wait for
the divorce. Typical waiting-period proposals prevent this relatively harmless
outcome, however, because they offer exceptions for the panoply of traditional
fault grounds, and sometimes also for mutual consent.' 5' Because "[pleople
wishing to divorce are unwilling to wait longer than necessary," the great
majority of couples in regimes offering waiting periods and expedited grounds
use the grounds, foregoing the wait.' 2 Instead of stopping or delaying
divorce, waiting periods thus often drive couples to use the mechanisms of
consent and fault regimes.153
Consent and fault mechanisms provoke parents to engage in conduct that
causes additional harms to children. Above all, these rules generate greater
parental conflict. In a no-fault regime, the initiator of divorce may feel an
internal compulsion to destroy the marriage before leaving it, but he or she has
no legal need to do so. In a consent or fault system, spousal consent becomes
crucial, either formally under a mutual consent provision or informally under
the de facto consent regime of a fault system." As four-fifths of divorces
are unilaterally initiated,'55 the initiating spouse may not be able to get
consent by asking for it, or may be afraid of asking for consent until certain
that it is forthcoming. Since kind conduct in these circumstances may only
strengthen the resolve of the noninitiating spouse to save the marriage, the
initiator who needs consent has an inducement to embitter his or her
partner.
56
151. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
152. EEKELAAR, supra note 107. at 37. In Ohio. vlhich grants consensual no-fault diorec after two
years or immediate divorce on proof of fault, one study found that in 1978 onl) 13% of dlorcing spouses
used the consensual provision. See ELLI.MAN ET AL.. supra note 16. at 194 At a time Aihcn Britain had a
law granting divorce after five years on unilateral petition. to %ears based on mutual consent, or
immediately because of fault, 73% of divorcing spouses used a fault ground, and feter than 8% used the
unilateral provision. See EEKELAAR, supra note 107. at 37. In the similarl, mixed systems of Australit and
Canada, studies likewise showed that "more divorces vere based on offence grounds than the separation
provisions." JOHN EEKELAAR, FAMiLY LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 42 (2d ed 1984)
153. Unlike most critics of no-fault divorce. Elizabeth Scott ackno%% ledges that a fault-based exception
to a waiting period will effectively scuttle the waiting period in man) cases. See Scott. supra note 10. at
92. Yet Scott does not follow this insight to its conclusion: Although ambiguous on the point, her proposed
regime would apparently permit legal separation-and hence alimony and child support-only upon proof
of fault. See id. at 93 (suggesting separation "[fnor those cases in shich the offenaise behivior destros the
value of the relationship" (emphasis added)); cf. LA. RE\. STAT A.', § 9 307 (\V\st 1997) (requiring fault
for separation). Especially when combined with a long waiting-penod requirement in which legal separation
would prove valuable for many couples, such a rule w ould encourage fault-based separation proceedings.
with the attendant effects of fault processes.
154. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
155. See FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN. sipra note 87. at 21-22
156. This incentive persists even though one party can informaly leae the other %kithout consent For
one thing, even when separation does occur, the need for consent pushes one spouse to pressure the other
to grant a divorce. More critically, in most instances under fault regimes. as a practical matter one spouse
has not separated until the two have agreed on divorce. See GOODE, supra note 135. at 179 (noting. in a
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Supporting this argument empirically, the leading study of divorce during
the 1950s suggests that husbands in the old fault regime did behave poorly in
order to get a divorce. In the typical case, the husband first decided to get a
divorce, then worked to "make himself so obnoxious that his wife is willing
to ask for and even insist upon a divorce."'' 57 The patterns of conduct he
employed, the study suggests, included heavy drinking and failure to provide
adequate economic support to the family.'58 Such conduct plainly does not
benefit children.
This behavior and its support in law have a cruel logic familiar from
Shklar's work. 159 Instead of expressing the ongoing affection for the family
that critics anticipate, the conduct reflects a relentless drive to exit marriage.
The law feeds this vicious behavior. Initiating spouses may be horrified to find
themselves destroying people they once adored.' 60 At the moment when
spouses have become more unkind than they imagined they could ever be, the
law will have engendered the cruelty that Shklar anticipates from moralistic
restrictions. 161
sample during the fault era, that more than 60% of separations occurred only after a final decision to
divorce had been reached); SPANIER & THOMPSON, supra note 147, at 49 (noting, in a study of a state with
a fault regime, that separation typically occurs when one spouse has "reached a level of certainty about the
breakup"). The initiating spouse apparently seeks to secure consent in advance. Perhaps the initiator wishes
to know that divorce is certain before taking the major step that separation involves. Perhaps he or she
wishes to preserve the leverage of continued cohabitation until the absolute decision to divorce. Whatever
its basis, the continued cohabitation of two spouses prior to the divorce decision gives the spouse wanting
a divorce an incentive to behave as miserably as possible toward the spouse not wanting one.
157. GOODE, supra note 135, at 135-36.
158. See id. at 149.
159. And from law and economics. The commentators who suggest that spouses will reach mutually
satisfactory agreement on terms of marriage overlook the possibility, familiar from discussion of bilateral
monopoly, that parties trapped in a conflict with each other may have incentives to engage in strategic and
destructive (or "inefficient") behavior. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders,
Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 91 (1978)
(describing the difficulty of reaching mutually advantageous agreements in bilateral monopoly situations).
160. See GOODE, supra note 135, at 136 (describing the typical husband as "not aware that he is
following out any such plan [to convince his wife to divorce him]").
161. One might argue that financially punishing fault, as the fault systems do and the mixed systems
permit, see supra note 21, will prevent one spouse from driving the other out of the marriage. If conduct
labeled by statute as "cruel" produces negative financial consequences, for example, then it may be thought
that a spouse will not engage in such conduct.
Although the rules governing finances are beyond the scope of this Note, it is worth explaining that
this thought is dubious for now-familiar reasons. First, many people will not consider a financial penalty
at all, instead focusing on exiting the marriage however they can. See supra Section II1.C. Many others will
have too little income to care about such a penalty. Cf. Herbert Jacob, Another Look at No-Fault Divorce
and the Post-Divorce Finances of Women, 23 L. & Soc'y REV. 95, 98 (1989) (noting that "most divorced
women ... receive little or nothing from [marital property and child support] even under the best of
circumstances"). If the law seeks to minimize the damage to children from divorce, then it will assure a
reasonable financial award regardless of fault, and the implications of a fault-based penalty will diminish
further.
Most importantly, the notion that the law can identify and block all of the roads that one spouse might
take to hurt the other rests upon a fantasy of moral clarity that skeptical liberalism questions and lived
experience refutes. Although egregious wrongs like adultery are easy to identify, the indignities that one
spouse inflicts upon the other often will not be labeled "fault." See Joseph Goldstein & Max Gitter, On
Abolition of Grounds for Divorce: A Model Statute & Commentary, 3 FAM. L.Q. 75, 79 (1969). Even when
wrongs are so labeled, the other spouse may well respond in kind. See Federico, supra note 130, at 103
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Legal restriction will induce particularly destructive behavior in the high-
conflict families that are already hurting children most. Battered women are
often afraid to confront their husbands with abuse allegations in the public way
that fault proceedings require. 162 These women are, of course, also unable to
obtain the consent of their batterers to divorce, and often will lack the financial
resources simply to leave the household without financial support guaranteed
by law. 163 As a result of a fault or consent system, therefore, many battered
women will remain trapped in their marriages. Children will suffer more as
their mothers are abused.' 6'
A restrictive divorce regime will also perversely affect families with high
levels of conflict short of abuse. Spouses in high-conflict relationships have an
unusually high incidence of psychological difficulties, including personality
disorders and pathologically hostile-dependent relationships. 65 Because
persons in such relationships are less likely to agree to split up,' 66 the need
to procure consent as a condition of divorce may become an additional source
of conflict. If such couples do enter an adversarial legal proceeding, it is likely
to become a drawn-out and intensely acrimonious affair. 61  This extended
conflict, in and out of court, will further harm children.
(describing a situation whose "prototype" is one in which "the Provoker . . starts an affair and then files
for divorce after learning that the Provokee has started an affair"). In that case. the court %%ill have great
difficulty determining who is "more" at fault. Cf. KRAUSE. supra note 12 1. at 34546 (descnbing difficulties
when both spouses have committed fault under the old system). More generally, one person may commit
fault such as adultery, but the other person may then take the actions that make continuing the mamage
impossible. See SPANIER & THOMPSON, supra note 147. at 70-71 (noting that "[ahhough separated men
and women view their spouses' extramarital experiences as coninbuting to marital problems. they do not
blame their spouses' sexual behavior for the final demise of their mamage") In those circumstances, the
spouse who finally "caused" marital breakdown has little to fear from a fault proceeding, because the other
spouse is already legally blameworthy. See KRAUSE. supra note 121. at 346. Because relationships are so
much more complex than fault rules, financial penalties will not stop mutually destructive conduct.
162. See Linda J. Lacey, Mandaoror Marriage "For the Sake of the Children": A Feminist Reply to
Elizabeth Scott, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1435, 1443-46 (1992).
163. See Suzanne K. Steinmetz. The Violent Family. in VIOLENCE IN THE HOME: INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES 51, 59 (Mary Lystad ed.. 1986) ("IT]hcre is a constant decrease in violence as income levels
go up."); Michael J. Strube & Linda S. Barbour, Factors Related to the Decision To Leave an Abusive
Relationship, 46 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 837, 837-38 (1984) ("[Tlhe fewer the resources a woman had, the
less likely she was to leave the abusive relationship.").
164. See Louise Silvern & Lynn Kaersvang. The Traumatized Children of Violent Marriages, 68 CIILD
WELFARE 421, 422 (1988).
165. See JANET R. JOHNSTON & LINDA E.G. CAMPBELL. IMPASSES OF DIVORCE 40 (1988) (stating that
"high-conflict divorcing parents have characterlike disorders" and "the propensity for forming complex
hostile-dependent relations"); Lynn Gigy & Joan B. Kell). Reasons for Divorce: Perspectives of Divorcing
Men and Women, 18 J. DIVORCE & REMtARRIAGE. Winter/Spnng 1992, at 169, 181 (noting that persons
in "high conflict/demeaning" relationships report more paranoid symptoms than average). cf. John G
Gunderson & Katherine A. Phillips, Personalin' Disorders. ti COMPREIIE.NSIVE TE.xTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY.
supra note 93, at 1425, 1435, 1437, 1440 (discussing the tendenc) of persons with personality disorders
to have significant interpersonal problems).
166. Cf STEVEN R.H. BEACH ET AL.. DEPRESSION IN MARRIAGE 78-79 (1990) (descnbing how a
marital "dyad containing a depressed member (has limited ability) to make progress in resol ing preexisting
marital distress").
167. See JOHNSTON & CAMPBELL- supra note 165. at 39-42 (descnbing viciousness of high-conflict
legal proceedings).
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Fault-based judicial proceedings also activate destructive impulses even in
families where conflict is not pathological.16 8 Because adversary processes
require one spouse to prove the other "guilty" of some fault, lawyers in such
cases often encourage parents to hurl vicious accusations at each other,
enlisting the children on their side if possible. 169 There is considerable
evidence that fault processes increase parental conflict, reduce parental
equipoise, and trap children in public shouting matches between their
parents. 170 All of these outcomes plainly harm children.'
7
'
Finally, the critics' view that a fault or consent system would help children
financially rests on a last misleading generalization. Viewed as a whole, the
historical evidence on the financial effects of the shift to no-fault is
inconclusive. Some studies show that women in no-fault states receive slightly
smaller settlements on average, 172 but others find no difference. 173 Where
the shift to no-fault divorce does appear to correlate with a small decline in
settlements, that decline may be the result of changes in the financial regime
that accompanied the shift to no-fault, not of no-fault per se. 174 It is thus
unclear how much, if at all, the relaxation of divorce restrictions hurt women
or children.
Even if fault and consent systems did help women and children twenty
years ago, the situation would be different today. The argument that restrictive
systems financially help women and children rests on the empirical claim that
most marriages end with men seeking divorce and women resisting it.' 75 This
claim is just an old sexual stereotype. During the fault era, men did initiate
divorce more often than women. 76 Today, women are more likely than men
168. See Elster, supra note 7, at 42 ("Social psychology research does not confirm the view that
aggression can be relieved by being expressed.... If anything, acting out leads to more aggression.").
169. See SPANIER & THOMPSON, supra note 147, at 94 (noting in a study of a state with fault law that
"advice [by lawyers] to exaggerate marital problems during the process of divorce was not an uncommon
occurrence"); cf Linda K. Girdner, Strategies of Conflict: Custody Litigation in the United States, J.
DIVORCE, Fall 1985, at 1, 8 (describing the tactics of "pumping," "coaching," and "poisoning" children).
170. See EEKELAAR, supra note 152, at 45-48; JOHNSTON & CAMPBELL, supra note 165. at 40;
ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS
OF CUSTODY 277-78 (1992); SPANIER & THOMPSON, supra note 147, at 92; Elaine A. Anderson, An
Exploration of a Divorce Statute: Implications for Future Policy Development, J. DIVORCE, Fall 1989, at
1, 14; Graham S. Saayman & R. Vanessa Saayman, The Adversarial Legal Process and Divorce, Negative
Effects upon the Psychological Adjustment of Children, J. DIVORCE, winter 1989, at 329, 329-30.
171. It is true, as some authors have pointed out, that parental conflict often persists in other locales,
such as custody fights. See Wardle, supra note 10, at 99-102. If the goal is to help children, however, then
this unfortunate fact commends efforts to alleviate destructive conflict in these other forums, not to add
another arena for acrimony to divorce. Mediation has had some success. See DESMOND ELLIS & NOREEN
STUCKLESS, MEDIATING AND NEGOTIATING MARITAL CONFLICTS 52-61 (1996).
172. See Peters, supra note 36, at 449.
173. See Jacob, supra note 161, at 108-I1.
174. See Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Divorce: Changing Rules, Changing Results, in DIVORCE
REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 44, at 75, 77 (showing that when changes in grounds and in
financial rules are disaggregated, the rules, not the grounds, were the determinants of settlement sizes).
175. See sources cited supra note 44.
176. See GOODE, supra note 135, at 133.
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to seek divorce,' even in families with children.' t ' For this simple reason,
a legal system that disadvantages the partner who wants to divorce will not
help women and children. In fact, if historians are right that women have
increasingly sought divorce as their financial prospects have improved,79 and
if women's employment rate and earnings relative to men's continue to
rise,'80 then the proportion of children benefiting from a fault or consent
regime is likely to shrink. There is no consistent connection between fault and
consent, on the one hand, and children's financial well-being, on the other.'
One financial effect of a fault system is guaranteed, however. Fault
divorces will always cost more than no-fault divorces. "2 These financial
costs will, of course, leave custodial parents more vulnerable and less able to
care for their children. But this is only the last way that sharp restrictions on
divorce, rather than controlling the damage to children from divorce, are likely
to increase that damage.
IV. CONTROLLING THE DAMAGE
The skeptical liberal sensibility commends restraints on the state not
because freedom always produces good, but because coercion can produce
greater evils than freedom. It is a bad thing for children that divorce rates
rapidly increased during the 1960s and 1970s, even if it is not as bad as critics
say. But tight restrictions on divorce would be worse on account of the social
complexity and individual perversity that skeptical liberals emphasize. Most
people reach the decision to divorce through psychologically skewed processes
not responsive to legal manipulation. Restrictive divorce laws do affect the
divorce process after the decision to divorce, but at that point they serve
177. See FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN. supra note 87, at 22. Gt"'-MIAN. jupra note 135. at 61.
VAUGHAN, supra note 135, at 221 n.34.
178. In the Pennsylvania study of divorced families with children. 64% of somcn and 47% of men
reported that women had first suggested divorce. while onl) 27% of s.oinen and 34% of men reported that
men had first suggested it. See SPANIER & THOMPsON. supra note 147. at 53
179. See CHERLIN, supra note 105. at 48-51 PtILLIPS. supra note 108. at 614-15
180. See CHERLIN, supra note 105. at 50 fig.2-4
181. The financial penalties of a fault system also %%ould not generally protect %omen Ideal
enforcement of that system is impossible for reasons explained above See supra note 161 Moreover.
although women are almost always the victims of a most egregious form of mantal fault-pousal physical
abuse--they are almost as likely as men to commit other kinds of fault, such as adultery See SPANIER &
THOMPSON, supra note 147, at 63: Albrecht & Kunz. supra note 146. at 326. Ailsa Burns. Petrelved
Causes of Marriage Breakdown and Conditions of lfe. 46 J. MARRIAGE & FA.t 551. 561 (1984) Women
are also more likely to seek exit from mamages due to interpersonal problems that. howeser as, ful. may
not constitute legally cognizable fault. See FURSTENBERG & CtIERLIN. supra note 87. at 19-20 The many
custodial mothers who have committed fault might be penalized with reduced financial awards in a fault
system, and the many who wish to divorce but cannot prose thetr husbands -guilty" sould be forced to
purchase divorces by bargaining away financial benefits. In both tnstances. children ssould suffer
182. Compare AHRONS, supra note 32. at 40 (estimating the cost of a no-fault divorce in Tennessee
at S300), with Sarah Homaday. Divorce Bill Costly for Poor Teians. At STIn A%1.-STATEStA.. Apr 10.
1997, at B9 (estimating the cost of a fault divorce in Texas under a proposed fault law at $5000 to
$I 0,000).
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chiefly to inflame passions and drain family resources in ways that harm
children.
If laws aiming to stop divorce by altering instrumental incentives
necessarily fail, it may appear that the law is entirely unable to help children
by reducing rates of divorce. This conclusion would be too strong. Legal
restrictions may not be able to alter an instrumental calculation that either does
not occur or occurs only erratically, but instrumental calculations are not the
only objects of law's influence.
Law can also contribute, in a modest way, to the ideological framework
within which individuals make choices, whether rational and calculating or
deluded and emotional. 183 To be sure, the power of laws over conduct-
directing norms should not be overstated.'84 Given the richness of everyday
life, people may not know what the law is, and if they do know, it may not
change the way they see an issue.185 Even when the law penetrates norms,
it still may not affect complex patterns of conduct. 8 6 In a diverse civil
society with many opposed norm-generating institutions, law-especially
liberal law-necessarily plays a limited role in altering ideologies. But it may
play a role nonetheless.
The notion that law has made some small contribution to conduct by
influencing background norms is consistent with both the data on divorce rates
and the skeptical liberal conception of personality. Among the many trends
beyond divorce law whose surge around 1968 likely sent the divorce rate
upward,1 87 the much publicized legal change in New York may have signaled
a new tolerance of divorce that subtly influenced conduct throughout the
country. Indeed, the increase in the divorce rate nationally following legal
changes in just a few states suggests that the law affected the divorce rate, if
it did so at all, by destigmatizing divorce, not by directly restricting
conduct. 188 This hypothesis is consistent with the recognition that conduct
during divorce may not be driven by conscious calculation. Individuals caught
up in a dimly grasped divorce process may still vary their conduct depending
183. See GLENDON, supra note 33, at 5-9, 138-39 (describing how law's storytelling power can alter
norms).
184. See EEKELAAR, supra note 107, at 22 ("Law may indeed affect social reality, but the nature and
extent of this relationship is uncertain and problematic."); GLENDON, supra note 33, at 139 (noting that law
contributes in a "modest ... way" to moral beliefs).
185. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
186. See Weisbrod, supra note 127, at 1005 ("Scholars whose concern is law/society issues suggest
that law may not be very important in causing particular behavior.").
187. See CHERLIN, supra note 105, at 48-53 (emphasizing the effect of women's employment on
divorce rates); cf WILLIAM L. O'NEILL, COMING APART: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF AMERICA IN THE
1960's at 360 (1971) (describing 1968 as "the hard year").
188. The legal rules in the few states changing their laws obviously did not apply to nonresidents. The
shift in values throughout the period is well-known. See PHILLIPS, supra note 108, at 625-26 (describing
the destigmatization of divorce during the 1960s); Galston, supra note 10, at 17 (noting the decline from
the 1960s in the percentage of Americans who believe parents should stay together "for the sake of their
children").
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on cultural norms. For example, although the "impulsion to divorce" is not a
product of means-ends rationality, it may reflect a norm that sets individual
happiness above all. 8 9 Similarly, even though wishful thinking may not vary
with barriers to divorce, it may respond to shifts in the perceived benefits of
divorce caused, for example, by a reduction in stigma." Even people who
are not calculating are influenced by community norms that the law shapes.
Although the law can thus affect norms in some measure, restrictive
regulation remains an improper way to do so for several reasons. The law's
influence on norms is still necessarily modest. The costs of influencing norms
through restriction is high: 9' The many children of the many parents who
divorce in spite of the law will suffer gravely from restrictive laws. Finally,
restrictive regulation is not even a necessary element of norm-altering
legislation. Scholars have noted the power of government expression even
absent coercion. 192 The data from the 1960s suggest that the New York law's
expressive dimension may have affected persons not directly regulated. Legal
regulation can accordingly seek to support cultural norms that encourage
parents to work out their problems, without imposing legal requirements that
trap those unable to do so. Symbolic measures in this spirit probably would not
have a large effect, but the critical point for the skeptical liberal is that these
kinds of laws would not cause further harm to children.
A law committed to controlling damage could harmlessly signal that
parents should try to work out problems in several ways. First, the state could
require marital counseling before divorce, provided that either financial
assistance or a waiver for indigency were made available." 3 If the amount
of counseling required were limited and financial aid were available, then a
counseling requirement would not substantially lengthen the breakdown
process, drain family resources, or create incentives for parents to fight as do
fault and consent requirements. Yet requiring some counseling would signal
a societal commitment to treating divorce as a last resort.19
189. Cf. Federico, supra note 130, at 97 (describing the decision to divorce as -an indiidual proces
motivated by individual concerns").
190. Even when a person is wishfully thinking about only the benefits of di'orec, those benefits ',IIll
appear smaller as a result of social stigma. For example. the indi'.idual contemplating diorce in a
traditional society can anticipate only the life of a pariah. not thai of an accepted member of the
community. See PHILLIPS, supra note 108, at 625-27. Cultural norms can thus penetrate procc-ese of
wishful thinking in a way that legal changes alone. ', hich do not alter the perceised benelis of life
following divorce, cannot.
191. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, On the Erpressive Function of Law. 144 U PA. L Rt%. 2021. 2025 (1996)
("[Il]f legal statements produce bad consequences, the) should not be enacted een if the) seem reasonable
or noble.").
192. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 79, at 634-36; Philip B. Heymann. Hoiv Gaovernmnit Etpresses Public
Ideas, in THE POWER OF PUBLIC IDEAS 85. 96-97 (Robert B. Retch ed.. 1988)
193. Mandatory counseling has recently been proposed in some legislaturt' See H R 268. 1997 Reg
Sess. (Ala.); H.R. 1172, 19th Leg.. Gen. Sess. (Haw. 1997): see also Scott. supra note 10. at 75 (dscusing
the merits of mandatory counseling).
194. In addition to its symbolic benefits, required counseling would likely do some imrntrumental good
by helping to ensure that parents have tried their best to avoid divorce. Cf Jessica Pearson. Ten Mihlh
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There is a second small change that might have positive symbolic effects
without negative repercussions. Currently, most states permitting divorce after
a waiting period require "separation" for the entire period. 9 5 To the extent
the law's language matters, this description of the waiting period as a
"separation" has come to suggest a way station on the road to divorce, and so
perhaps serves to reinforce the inevitability of the result. In substance,
separation may help couples grasp the gravity of divorce, but that purpose can
be achieved with a separation just before divorce. Demanding separation in
order to begin the waiting period requires couples who are not certain about
divorce to break up more quickly so that they can obtain a divorce sooner. In
this instance, the state is actually encouraging marital breakdown, not merely
permitting it. If the waiting period were reconceived as a "reflection period"
in which couples would seek counseling, and if actual separation were optional
until the end of the period (for example, one month before divorce), then a few
couples might avert divorce. Just as important, none would be driven into new
conflict by the addition of this option.'96
Finally, a reflection period of one year or less 9 ' for families with
children can signal that divorce should be carefully considered without
increasing conflict, provided that two other rules are in place. First, exceptions
should not be available based upon consent or fault.'98 These grounds
provide irresistible and destructive incentives for parents: to heighten conflict
in order to end marriages more quickly and, later, to stage destructive court
battles. Second, immediate formal separation without proof of fault should be
available, and where desired should include not only alimony and child
About Family Law, 27 FAM. L.Q. 279, 286-87 (1993) (arguing that the success of mediation "depends more
upon the quality of the program and the issue being mediated than whether the program is voluntary or
mandatory").
It may be objected that state-sponsored counseling involves troubling government interference in
private life. Indeed, such counseling was an element of the initial no-fault reforms and failed partly because
of its intrusiveness. See DFONZO, supra note 20, at 163-64, 168-69. To avoid this problem, states could
encourage people to choose counseling services from a panoply of nongovernmental organizations, religious
and secular. Because these institutions can be sensitive to cultural variation in a way that government is
not, they are ideal providers of counseling.
195. In some of these states, separation is the only no-fault basis for divorce. See, e.g., MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 7-103 (1996) (requiring a one-year separation if there is no prospect of reconciliation,
two years otherwise); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1995) (requiring, except in cases of insanity, that parties
live "separate and apart" for one year before divorcing); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Michie 1995) (requiring
a one-year separation if the divorce is unilateral or if there are children). Many proposals to mandate
waiting periods, including the Louisiana law just implemented, also require separation throughout the
waiting period as a condition of divorce. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:307(A)(5) (West 1997)
(requiring that spouses live "separate and apart continuously without reconciliation for a period of two
years").
196. In other words, the law would "do no harm." See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
197. One year is not substantially longer than the wait for most civil litigation. See GLENDON, supra
note 21, at 189.




support, but also distribution of marital property.' 99 This is the only way to
ensure that the custodial parent has access to fully adequate financial resources,
and that parents in high-conflict families, including battered women, can exit
marriages without jumping through the hoops of fault and consent. Under this
proposal, parents who want it would be able to obtain, immediately and
without proof of fault or consent, the security of legal divorce, without the
decree permitting remarriage. By limiting the application of a waiting period
requirement to families with children, society could also spotlight the negative
effects of marital breakdown on children.2 1 Such a law would encourage
parents to consider divorce carefully for their children's sake, not to hurt their
children inadvertently to get a divorce.
V. CONCLUSION
Halting steps like these will not eliminate high levels of divorce that were
decades in the making. But achieving such change through law is a hazardous
goal. Not making people better, but learning to live with "ourselves as we have
come to be,"20 ' is the work that both skeptical liberalism and the facts about
divorce commend to government. It is because liberal citizens must learn to
accept limits on their use of law to improve moral life that liberalism is
"extremely difficult and constraining, far too much so for those who cannot
endure contradiction, complexity, diversity, and the risks of freedom., 20 2 But
restraint is a genuine virtue: Where divorce is the issue, it is better to live with
the problems of relatively unregulated private life than to impose the greater
problems of strict regulation. Expecting too much from people and their
government does children no favors.
199. Some states currently have laws allowing separation without fault and permilning distnbution of
property thereafter. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81 (1995). KY REV. STAT A.,, § 403 050 (.ichie
1984); see also UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307. 9A U LA 239 (1987) Some states. hosteer.
do not. See, e.g.. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-7 (1995) (requiring fault for separation). Clifford , Clifford. 42
Haw. 279 (1958) (forbidding property distribution upon separation) Scott's plan wvould apparently conditton
separation upon fault, see supra note 153, and provide only for the "protection." not the distribution, of
assets at separation, see Scott, supra note 10. at 93.
200. This suggestion builds on proposals by some of no-fault's critics to create distinct marital regimes
for couples with and without children. See Scott. supra note 10. at 80-82. Galston. supra note 10. at 22
201. OAKESHOTr, supra note 60, at 424.
202. SHKLAR, supra note 63. at 5.
1998] 1465

